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Abstract 
An autonomous actor should decide on its own which goals and strategies to pursue in a new situation 
involving multiple actors. Humans in such cases typically rely on social factors, such as individual 
relationships and ethical background. An artificial autonomous agent in such cases can be more useful 
and efficient as an actor in a human team, if its behavior is believable, i.e., similar to the naturally 
motivated human behavior. This similarity can be achieved in a cognitive architecture through the 
attribution of characters to actors and human-like reasoning in terms of ethical norms and moral 
schemas applied to developing individual relationships among characters. Whether the actor's behavior 
is sufficiently human-like and human-compatible in this sense, can be judged based on a Turing-like 
test that is described and analyzed here in simplistic videogame settings. The challenge for an artificial 
actor is to be preferred, over its human rival, as a trustworthy partner of the human participant. 
Additional metrics include behavioral characteristics derived from the study of cognitive architecture 
eBICA. The paradigm extends to other settings as well, and can be useful for evaluation of cognitive 
architectures that support near-human-level social emotionality. 
 
Keywords: emotional cognition; human-level AI; Turing test; believability 
1 Introduction 
Machine autonomy (Klenk et al., 2013; Roberts et al., 2014, 2015) is vital in heterogeneous 
(including humans and robots) teams of agents, performing their missions in unexpected challenging 
situations. An autonomous actor should decide on its own which goals to set and pursue in a new 
situation involving multiple actors. Humans in such cases typically rely on social factors, including (a) 
individual pre-existing and emergent relationships, such as trust, subordination, delegation, 
partnership, etc., and (b) ethical norms and background. An artificial autonomous agent can be useful 
and efficient as an actor in a human team, if it is similar to a human in its goal reasoning. This 
similarity can be achieved in a cognitive system through the attribution of characters to actors and 
human-like reasoning in terms of ethical norms and developing individual relationships among those 
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characters, resulting in human-like character-oriented narrative goal reasoning (believable character 
reasoning: Samsonovich, 2015). Whether actor’s behavior is sufficiently human-like and human-
compatible in this sense, can be judged based on Turing-like tests and behavioral characteristics 
derived from the cognitive architecture eBICA (Samsonovich, 2013), applied to specifically designed 
test scenarios in a simplistic virtual environment, as described below. 
Defining the right tests, metrics, benchmarks and challenges can be vital for solving big practical 
problems, such as achieving a general-purpose human-level artificial intelligence (AI: McCarthy et al., 
1955). Formulating the whole problem as a specific challenge is in general a big step forward. 
Unfortunately, the Turing test (Turing, 1950) proposed for this purpose did not prove very useful so 
far (Korukonda, 2003), while formally speaking, it still captures the human-level AI challenge 
(HLAI). 
Many attempts to brake HLAI and related challenges into a list (Newell, 1990), or a ladder, or a 
Decathlon (Mueller et al., 2007) of more specific cognitive tests were made. None of them yet led us 
to a long-awaited breakthrough in AI. The problem is that certain functionality of the human mind still 
escapes all proposed so far tests and metrics. In other words, there is a residual ‘magic’ of human 
cognition (Samsonovich, Ascoli & DeJong, 2006) that is not captured yet by any mathematical 
formalism. The most notable of these capacities is the human social-emotional intelligence, that is a 
cornerstone of the human mind and also supports its other top functionality, such as creativity, 
prospective episodic memory, active learning ability, theory of mind, system of values, and more. At 
the same time, the laws of human emotional cognition may be relatively simple in their essence, and 
expressible mathematically. Validating their implementation in an artifact requires a test that is 
relatively easy to implement and that captures the essential human social emotional intellect. A 
possible definition and analysis of a test of this sort is presented here.  
1.1 Believable Character Reasoning 
Character reasoning (CR) (Samsonovich & Aha, 2015) involves the concepts of a character and a 
character arc (these terms are explained below). Here characters are distinguished from actors. A 
character in CR is an abstraction, which is a virtual rational agent with its own goals, motives, senses, 
affordances, knowledge, and recent history (Haven, 2007, 2014). A character type is a class of 
characters given by a subset of character attributes (e.g., can be given by motives only). The top goal 
of a character may change in the course of character evolution, or character arc. This notion of a 
character is also distinct from a role in multi-agent planning literature (Campbell & Wu, 2011), which 
implies a fixed pattern of behavior. A character arc is the sequence of goals, intentions and other 
internal states experienced by the character through the narrative (Samsonovich & Aha, 2015). One 
actor can perform multiple characters, and vice versa. Selecting the types of characters and assigning 
characters to actors is called casting, or characterization. In team challenges, casting usually 
predetermines a solution of the problem (examples are presented below). 
 Character reasoning in AI belongs to the domain of narrative reasoning (Abell, 2009; 
Schmid, 2010; Finlayson & Corman, 2013), including narrative planning (Riedl & Young, 2010), 
which is different from other forms of planning in that all intentions and actions of actors in narrative 
planning must be motivated. In the present work, believable character reasoning (BCR) is understood 
as a kind of character reasoning in which goals, intentions and actions of an actor are justified by 
human-like motives. This rule applies to self and to other actors. Instead of providing a general 
criterion or definition for “human-likeness”, it is assume that a list of human-like motives is given, and 
all other possible motives are considered not human-like and therefore not useful for BCR. 
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2 Definition of the Test: “The Russian Elevator Story” 
2.1 Settings and the Paradigm 
The following scenario is inspired by many Russian TV news about elevators in Moscow; it is 
supposed to be implemented as a computer game. The elevator car is stuck between floors. Three 
actors are locked inside, but are free to move around the cabin. They may greet one another, kick each 
other, move from place to place, and help each other to escape, as described below. These are all their 
available behaviors. The cabin has one emergency door, but nobody knows in advance where it is. At 
some point in time this door opens, and it becomes clear that the cabin is hanging between floors, with 
the exit located next to the ceiling of the cabin. Therefore, in order to escape, two actors need to stand 
beside the door (there is only room for two next to the door) and work together. First, one of them 
should give a lift to the partner, who then will be able to climb out and offer a hand to another one. All 
actions are voluntary, and should be initiated by the actors themselves. E.g., the actor receiving a hand 
still needs to actively climb out in order to escape (Figure 1.). Of course, the first escapee may do 
nothing, or may offer a hand to the third actor instead of the partner. The scenario is repeated a 
number of times with the same participants, represented in Figure 1 by abstract shapes: a circle, a 
triangle, and a square. The score of each player is the number of times this payer escapes from the 
elevator. 
2.2 Detailed Requirements for an Implementation 
Possible actions of the actors are initiated by mouse clicks and are listed in the table below. They 
occur in parallel and asynchronously. When a new action is initiated, the execution of the current 
action by that actor terminates, and the new action starts. The following rule is enforced: when the first 
two actors escape, the elevator car immediately falls down, killing the third actor. In any case, 
however, the cabin must fall within a certain time interval after the door opens, even if no one escapes. 
The precise moment of its premature fall is not known a priori and is sampled probabilistically. 
Among other constraints: any two actors cannot occupy the same place; if this happens during their 
motion, they bounce from each other. This kind of a collision is different from an intentional kick. A 
kick is possible within a certain range of distances and results in the target actor flying all the way to 
the opposite side of the cabin, while the author of the kick remains in place. If a kick is attempted 
outside of the kicking range, then nothing happens. An actor that escaped from the elevator cannot 
kick others. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Circle offers a hand to Triangle. 
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Table 1. Actions available to participants. * 
 
Action Context, conditions Outcome Affective appraisal* 
Left-click on a free 
space inside the cabin 
Inside the cabin A smooth move along 
the straight line toward 
the target location 
Depends on the 
context. Yield: (0,-1), 
hit: (0,1), getting to 
the door: (-1,0), by 
default (0, 0). 
Left-click on a free 
space outside the cabin 
If next to the door and 
given a lift or being 
offered a hand 
The actor climbs out of 
the cabin 
(0, 10) 
Right-click on another 
actor 
Inside the cabin, within 
the kicking range 
Kick: the target flies  to 
the opposite side of the 
cabin. 
(-5, 5) 
Left-click on an actor Inside the cabin, not 
both are at the door 
Greeting sent to the 
actor 
(1, 0) 
Left-click on an actor Inside the cabin, both 
are at the door 
Giving a lift to the 
actor 
(10, -10) 
Left-click on an actor Outside the cabin, both 
are at the door 
Offering a hand to the 
actor 
(10, 0) 
    
 
2.3 Metrics and the Proposed Challenge 
The metrics include the overall performance score, calculated as the frequency of escapes, plus 
behavior-based appraisals (valence, dominance) calculated as prescribed by dynamics of the eBICA 
model (Samsonovich, 2013), using the estimated values of the appraisals of actions (Table 1; Section 
3.2). 
The main challenge for an artificial intelligent agent in this paradigm, involving in addition two 
human participants, is to reliably produce behavior resulting in a human-level or higher-than-human-
level performance score. Arguably, this implies passing a limited Turing test, since the artificial actor 
must be selected as the trustworthy partner by one human participant, over the other human participant 
as the alternative choice. 
The secondary challenge is to achieve behavior-based appraisals (valence, dominance) of an 
artificial actor that are statistically similar to those of human participants, without a significant average 
difference in the values, calculated based on 100 trials. 
3 Analysis and Approaches 
3.1 A Simplified Analysis Involving Traditional Approaches 
To simplify preliminary consideration, the following assumptions will be made, that may not hold 
in a real test.  
                                                            
*  Numbers could be obtained by rounding the semantic coordinates of words that name the actions, using the weak 
semantic map (e.g., hit (0,1), greet (1,0), yield (0,-1) [Samsonovich, 2013]), then multiplying by the estimated significance of 
the action. 
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• Each actor attempts to solve sequentially two tasks: (1) selection of the partner with whom to 
cooperate, with confirmation of mutual commitment by exchange of greetings; and (2) performing 
a cooperative escape together with the selected partner.  
• Actor positions can be ranked based on their suitability for escape: A - the most suitable, B - 
intermediate, and C - the least suitable. For the sake of the argument, it will be assumed here that 
if A and B cooperate, they both are guaranteed to escape; for A and C the chances are 75%, and 
for B and C, if they cooperate, the chances of escape for both are 50% (the real probabilities will 
depend on parameters of the settings). 
Among the approaches that may guide players in strategy selection in this game, a traditional 
game-theoretic approach can be considered first. It assumes that each player is rational, and therefore 
is not affected by personal relations with others or any other psychological factors. Therefore, all 
actors a priori should be treated as identical, and may differ from each other only by their relative 
positions in the environment. As a result, selection of the partner will be done based on the analysis of 
relative actor positions with respect to the exit. The optimal strategy based on these assumptions is (a) 
to partner with the one who is in a better position for escape. Hence, A and B will decide to partner 
with each other and will escape together. Because the initial positions are randomly sampled, the 
expected score for each actor is 2/3, which corresponds to a Nash equilibrium.  
On the other hand, suppose that two players, e.g., Circle and Triangle, decide to always cooperate 
with each other, regardless of their initial positions, while Square keeps strategy (a). Then both Circle 
and Triangle can achieve average scores higher than 2/3. Indeed, given the above assumed numbers, 
their scores will be (1+0.75+0.5)/3=0.75, while for the Square who cannot cooperate with anybody the 
score will be zero. This, however, is not a Nash equilibrium: e.g., Circle can improve its score by 
switching to strategy (a), if the other two actors keep their strategies. 
In general, human behavior in cooperative economic games such as the prisoner dilemma, the 
dictator game, the ultimatum game, the trust game, the public goods game, etc. is typically not 
rational, and is guided by so-called “social preferences” that include ethics, morality, feelings and 
other cultural and psychological factors (e.g., Durlauf & Blume, 2008). The proposed paradigm should 
not be an exception in this sense. The present purpose, however, is not to dive into the field of 
experimental economics, but to define a paradigm in which human emotional cognition can manifest 
itself, and can be compared with machine emotional intelligence. Therefore, a serious economic game-
theoretic analysis of the proposed test would be unwarranted in this context. 
3.2 Approach to Solution Based on the eBICA Model 
The human level of performance in the proposed paradigm can be achieved by mimicking human 
behavior. This presumably can be done using eBICA (Samsonovich, 2013) as the basis. The eBICA 
model is based on three main extensions of the standard building blocks of a cognitive architecture: a 
moral schema, an emotional state, and an emotional appraisal that is attributed to every cognitive 
representation in this model and determines dynamics of learning and decision making. The general 
cognitive cycle of eBICA includes perception, cognition, decision making and learning. Here learning 
consists in updating appraisals and instances of moral schemas. The values of emotional appraisals 
and emotional states are given by the weak cognitive map (Samsonovich and Ascoli, 2010), which 
uses an abstract vector space to represent semantic relations. Here this space is reduced to two 
dimensions, representing valence and dominance-arousal. 
The core eBICA (“zeroth approximation”) operates with-out engaging moral schemas or emotional 
states (Samsono-vich, 2013). In the given paradigm, there are only 3 dynamic emotional variables in 
this model: appraisals of the 3 agents. Each of the possible actions of an actor has a fixed affective 
appraisal given in Table 1. Appraisal values A are 2-D vec-tors that are treated here for convenience of 
implementation as complex numbers: 
A=(valence, dominance). 
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In this case, valence = Re(A), and dominance = Im(A). Dynamical equations used to update the 
appraisals of actors are (Samsonovich, 2013):     
         
             
Here t is the turn number, and r is a small positive parameter (that is typically set to 0.01). Thus, 
appraisals of actors calculated according to (1) can be used as eBICA-inspired behavioral metrics, in 
addition to the performance score (see Section 2.2). 
Behavior of a virtual actor generated by eBICA in the selected paradigm is based on a BCR-
generated plot, which assumes assignment of characters (Partner, Opponent) to the two other actors 
and generation of moves using goal-directed navigation consistent with the plot. All decisions, 
including character-to-actor assignment and move selection, are treated as probabilistic actions that 
biased by the likelihood L of the action, that according to eBICA (Samsonovich, 2013) is proportional 
to 
       .     (2) 
Here    is equal to the positive values of x and is zero otherwise, A* is the complex conjugate 
of A. Intuitively, this formula means that the action is more likely to be selected, when its appraisal 
matches the appraisal of the actor and also matches the appraisal of the target, in which the dominance 
component is inverted. 
At the next level (“first-approximation” eBICA), moral schemas are engaged that describe social 
relations among characters. Here details are not presented; the idea is that once a moral schema is 
instantiated in working memory and bound to actors via the associated characters, it stabilizes actors’ 
appraisals. As a result, the same partner will be selected again and again; in other words, actors form 
stable social relations. 
The instance of a moral schema (e.g., trust or friendship) at the same time works as a pattern 
recognizer, continuously questioning whether the actors behavior matches the schema. If a significant 
misnatch occurs (e.g., my partner traded me for the opponent to take a momentary advantage), then the 
actor is no longer recognized as a part of the schema instance, and should be unbound and repelled.  
Here the schema instance acts as a virtual character on its own, driven by its motives that generate 
goals and actions. Thus, friendship can be viewed as a character whose motive is to see both friends 
happy and cooperating with each other. This will result in a certain human-like behavior of the 
eBICA-driven virtual actor in selected paradigm. 
4 Discussion 
What sort of behavior can one expect from a normal human participant in this paradigm? The 
answer depends on many circumstances, including the context and setup, cultural and ethical 
background, and pre-existing relations. Even the goal that a participant would be most likely to set for 
himself or herself may be hard to predict. E.g., if this is a computer game played just for fun or for a 
small reward, then the goal may become to maximize the score. On the other hand, in a real-life 
situation involving life and death, e.g., an idealized true gentleman may care about saving others more 
than self, even if the other two actors are unknown to him. This goal may result in a self-sacrifice 
(e.g., by yielding a spot near the door to others); however, self-sacrifice does not become a part of the 
goal, for there may be no good reason even for a true gentleman in this scenario to reject a lift or a 
hand offered to him by another actor, given the limited and uncertain remaining time. All this assumes 
that the unknown actors behave nicely. However, if somebody of them does something ugly, e.g., 
kicks others in order to get to the door first, then in a gentleman’s mind he may become immediately 
exempt from the previous policy, resulting in a new goal setting. To give a more extreme example, 
when an escalator jams and people on it are about to die from pressure, apparently respectful and 
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polite gentleman suddenly start behaving like animals, trying to hurt each other more than to save 
themselves (observed by the author, when riding a parallel escalator in Moscow). It is not the present 
purpose, however, to address human behavior affected by strong pain and other extreme physiological 
conditions. 
The goal setting by participants of the elevator game may be very different yet in a situation when 
certain relationships among actors pre-exist, e.g., two of them are friends that trust each other and 
cannot let each other down, while both do not care about the third one. Such relationships may emerge 
in an ad hoc group and may change during the game. It is imaginable, e.g., that in an animal-like 
group, friendship relationships may emerge between two actors who start showing kindness to each 
other. 
Even when the goal set, e.g., to maximize own score, the sub-goaling remains nontrivial and 
ambiguous. Because a good-will initiative of another actor is needed for any escape, the critical 
question is how to select the partner that can be trusted. Should it be the one who simply happened to 
be closest to the door? Or the one who has been more kind and cooperative so far? Then, what to do if 
the partner of choice changes behavior? The bottom line here is that a simple game-theoretic analysis 
may not be sufficient to generate a winning strategy in this game with human participants involved. A 
sophisticated theory-of-mind analysis may be necessary, based on a mature cognitive architecture, 
compatible with the human mind. 
Therefore, the challenge described in this paper can be offered as a test for human-level social-
emotional intelligence. It is inspired by a related challenge of animated cartoon interpretation (Heider 
& Simmel, 1944) that is quite old and was designed for testing humans. The described Russian 
elevator story also extends the previously used more limited paradigm, with no specific goal involved 
(Samsonovich, 2013). In the proposed here version, the performance metric and the criterion for 
passing the challenge are quite specific. This test defines a benchmark that will separate cognitive 
models and architectures into two categories: the ones that can pass it and the ones that cannot. 
Because this separation is based on the human-compatibility relevant to the BICA Challenge 
(Samsonovich, 2012), it appears practically useful and significant for future progress in AI. Many 
other practically useful challenges can be proposed for AI: e.g., the Wisconsin card sorting challenge, 
that cannot be solved by reinforcement learning, but is easily solved by humans. The challenge 
described here is unique among those proposed for AI, in that it specifically addresses the social-
emotional intellect. 
At the same time, a bigger question remains open: how to improve on this paradigm, while keeping 
it sufficiently simple to be considered feasible in the near future, and at the same time capturing those 
functional abilities of the human mind that are critical for collaboration in a team in unexpected 
situations.  
4.1 Conclusions 
Artificial autonomous agents will be more useful and efficient as heterogeneous team members, if 
their behavior will be believable. The believability can be achieved based on a cognitive architecture 
through the attribution of characters to actors and human-like reasoning in terms of ethical norms and 
moral schemas applied to developing individual relationships among characters, based on the eBICA 
model.  
Whether the actor's behavior is sufficiently believable and human-compatible, can be judged based 
on a Turing-like test that was described and analyzed here, assuming simplistic videogame settings. 
The test that an artificial actor should pass is to become preferred, over its human rival, as a 
trustworthy partner of the human participant.  
Additional metrics that can help to evaluate the quality of the virtual actor include behavioral 
characteristics derived from the study of cognitive architecture Ebica (Section 3.2).  
The solution to this challenge, if found in the form of a cognitive architecture with specific 
parameters, should be tested in other paradigms, such as economic games; however, economic games 
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by themselves are not a good alternative as a starting point (Durlauf & Blume, 2008). E.g., the 
prisoner dilemma paradigm taken as a Turing test would be trivial to pass by adjusting the probability 
of decision making. 
The applicability of eBICA extends to many domains, which makes the model useful for 
evaluation of cognitive architectures that support near-human-level social emotionality. 
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